Abstract: We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide between locating in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments and in one without employment protection. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty, we demonstrate that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. The strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with employment protection while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand, provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.
INTRODUCTION
This paper contributes to the understanding of the complex interface between globalisation and labour standards by focussing on the effects of employment protection on the international location of economic activity.
In the past few decades the liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI) policies worldwide has led to an increase in the ease with which firms (and jobs) move across national borders. As a result, governments' rhetoric and policies increasingly betray concerns about their countries' ability to prevent domestic industry from relocating abroad and to attract and/or retain foreign investment.
Labour market institutions are commonly regarded as crucial in determining the location of economic activity, not least if they influence the flexibility with which firms can adjust output scale and employment levels to evolving economic conditions. Employment protection laws in particular are identified as a major source of inflexibility 1 since, by forcing them to under-produce during economic booms and over-produce when the economy slows down, high hiring and firing costs undermine firms' ability to adapt to fast changing competitive markets. 2 This view is supported by empirical work that finds that firms in countries characterised by a high degree of employment protection are less likely to reduce output after a negative shock (e.g. Bertola et al 2010) . 3 Not only are the rigidities resulting from employment protection held responsible for the poor employment performance of many European countries (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower 1988; and Lazear 1990) 4 , but also for hindering countries' ability to hold on to footloose industries. In particular, the substantial differences that exist between economies, even within the European Union, in hiring and firing restrictions 5 are seen as a source of unfair 'competitive advantage' for those locations 1 See, for instance, the OECD report (2004) that states that 'Laws on firing or layoffs and other employment protection regulations are thought by many to be a key factor in generating labour market "rigidity" …'.
2 Several authors argue employment responses to shocks and/or the business cycle to be smaller when employment protection is higher (e.g. Bertola and Rogerson 1997; Garibaldi 1998; Messina and Vallanti 2007) . 3 In earlier work, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) find that firing costs are likely to have reduced employment variation in Europe. 4 However, Nickell (1998) finds that hiring and firing restrictions typically do not have a decisive role on overall rates of unemployment. 5 The OECD Employment Protection index (2008) ranges from 1.09 and 1.39 in the UK and Ireland respectively to 3.11 and 3.39 in Spain and Luxembourg respectively.
with lower employment adjustment costs 6 and, increasingly, recommendations are put forward that the state-mandated redundancy payments -that were introduced in many European countries from the late 1950s to the early 1970s -are dismantled.
In this paper our aim is to study the effects of inflexibilities arising from employment protection on firms' location decisions. 7 We address this issue by focussing on firms' location decisions when the prospective host countries are developed countries with quite similar labour costs but differences in labour market legislations.
Existing empirical evidence suggests that the effects of employment protection on the location decision of multinational corporations are not that clear-cut. The majority of the empirical work on this issue focuses on the relationship between a host country's employment legislation and its inward FDI. Cooke (1997) finds that host countries' restrictive legislation governing layoffs have had a negative effect on US FDI abroad. Moran (1998) summarises evidence from investor surveys and mentions labour regulations, in particular "flexibility in hiring and laying off workers", as one of the main concerns for firm location in transition and developing economies. More recently, Nicoletti et al (2003) and Görg (2005) also find evidence that employment protection can have a negative effect on inward FDI. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) obtain results that suggest that, other things being equal, the more flexible a FDI host country's labour market is relative to that in the source country, the higher the probability of inward FDI taking place. They also find that labour market flexibility matters more for firms in the service sector than in manufacturing. Haaland et al (2002) find that western MNEs locating in Eastern Europe tend to prefer locations with more flexible labour markets. However, Leibrecht and Scharler (2009) find that while FDI flows are higher in countries with lower unit labour costs, hiring and firing rigidities do not have statistically significant effects on FDI flows. Dewit, Görg and Montagna (2009) examined the relationship between employment protection and outward FDI and find that a high domestic level of employment protection tends to discourage outward FDI, suggesting that strict employment protection in a firm's 6 In a theoretical paper, Cuñat and Melitz (2012) show how international differences in labour market regulations can indeed generate a comparative advantage. 7 As such, we are not concerned with studying the general existence of inflexibilities in inter-temporal output adjustments (as is the case in Lapham and Ware 1994 and Jun and Vives 2004 ; note that these papers are not concerned with firms' location decisions).
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where employment is less flexible may benefit from the potential advantages obtained by the commitment power that such inflexibility implies.
Our analysis will be driven by two substantive questions. First, could location-specific sources of inflexibility create strategic advantages that affect local anchorage of domestic firms as well as a country's ability to attract production of internationally mobile firms? To explore the relationship between employment protection and firm location, we combine ideas from different strands of the literature, and apply these to a set-up in which firms' locations are endogenous. By emphasising the effect of oligopolistic interaction on the relationship between employment protection and the location of industry our paper fills an important gap in the literature. Second, we ask when we can expect to find strategic clustering in the same regions and when strategic geographical dispersion is more likely. In addressing this question, the paper complements the economic geography literature, which is mainly concerned with agglomeration formation in non-strategic set-ups.
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The paper also contributes to the theoretical literature on FDI. A large body of the theoretical work on firm location has focussed on market access and local costs of production as the central determinants of a country's ability to attract FDI and retain domestic firms. Seminal contributions include Smith (1987) and Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 1992) . 11 In some recent work, firms with different levels of productivity are sorted into domestic firms, exporters and firms that do FDI (e.g., Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) . More recently, a significant body of work has emerged that studies the role of labour market institutions in firm location. The bulk of this literature has focussed on the part played by labour unions. 12 Relatively less explored, despite its prominence in policy debates, is the relationship between employment protection and firm location. Notable exceptions are Haaland et al (2002) and Haaland and Wooton (2007) who analyse the location decision of a single multinational choosing between a more and a less flexible location. These papers, however, focus on the monopoly case and thus abstract from issues of strategic there is no incentive to strategically affect rivals' actions (Tirole 1988 provides a detailed explanation of the difference between a multistage game and the open-loop benchmark). While a useful device for theoretical comparison, this hypothetical benchmark would, of course, fail to capture the intertemporal aspect of the issue here. 10 See, for instance, Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) . 11 For surveys on multinationals and FDI, see Caves (1996) and Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004) .
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Early contributions include Bughin and Vannini (1995) , Zhao (1995 Zhao ( , 2001 , and Leahy and Montagna (2000) .
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interaction between firms which can be influenced by the flexibility of the labour market. Among earlier papers that focus on the flexibility considerations in location choice, though not on the role of employment protection, de Meza and Van der Ploeg (1987) and Sung and Lapan (2000) respectively consider the role of cost and exchange rate uncertainty in providing a rationale for setting up plants in different countries. By contrast, in our paper strategic behaviour is at the forefront. As such, our work is linked to the Industrial Organisation literature on adjustment costs, flexibility and strategic behaviour. The effect of adjustment costs on strategic behaviour in the product market has been discussed in set-ups without location decisions (see Lapham and Ware, 1994; Jun and Vives, 2004) . In a recent paper, Kessing (2006) has developed a model without location choice in which, by reducing flexibility, employment protection acts as a commitment device that can affect a rival's behaviour. Our paper has, however, a very different focus to his. Kessing considers a contest, an all-pay auction, between rival firms for a given (large-scale) contract. In his framework, price and quantity decisions are not modelled. By contrast, our model uses a standard oligopoly framework, distinguishing between Cournot and Bertrand competition, and highlights the fact that the results depend on the mode of competition and hence on the specific features of the oligopolistic industry. Another key difference from Kessing is that market uncertainty is modelled in our set-up, which allows us to study the trade-off firms face between commitment and flexibility. Furthermore, importantly, unlike Kessing (2006) , our framework allows us to endogenise firms' location in the context of a trade-off between retaining flexibility and benefitting from commitment.
We show that the effect of employment protection legislation on location patterns strongly differs depending on whether firms compete in prices or quantities.
With quantity competition, a firm producing in a country with a relatively inflexible labour market (i.e., with relatively strict employment protection) has a strategic advantage over a rival that produces in a country with a flexible labour market (i.e., in the absence of employment protection), as it can use employment protection as a commitment mechanism to secure a large future market share at the expense of its flexible rival. This makes the inflexible location strategically attractive. When competing in prices, both firms will engage in strategic pricing as long as one firm is located in the inflexible location. The strategic pricing of the firm in the flexible location harms the firm in the inflexible location and hence the flexible location 6 becomes strategically attractive: both firms locating in the flexible location eliminates such harmful rival strategic pricing. Thus, our model provides a theoretical rationale for the ambiguity that emerges from the empirical literature on the effects of employment protection on FDI and firm location.
The model is presented in Section 1. The determinants of location for a monopolist firm are analysed in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyse, respectively, the location decisions of oligopolistic firms under Cournot and under Bertrand competition. In section 5, some possible extensions of the model are discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
I. THE MODEL
Two firms plan to launch new products, which are imperfect substitutes, to be sold in an integrated market.
13 One firm, the Home firm, has its headquarters in the country named "Home", while the other, referred to as the Foreign firm, has its headquarters in the country named "Foreign". Each has to decide where to locate its production plant: either in "Home" or in "Foreign". We assume that the fixed costs of setting up a plant are sufficiently high to ensure that each firm chooses to have one plant only.
Competition takes place during two periods, with firms choosing "actions" -outputs In period two, the firms' respective demand functions are: 13 In order to bring out more sharply the effects on location of inter-country asymmetries in labour market rigidities, we choose to abstract from trade-cost jumping considerations. The effects of relaxing this assumption will be discussed in Section 6. Blonigen (2006) calls "access-to-information costs", e.g., information and network costs associated with setting up a plant in a foreign country (including dealing with foreign languages and coordination of suppliers) and acquiring knowledge of the local regulatory environment (such as foreign laws, a foreign taxation system and foreign ownership restrictions). The parameter δ should be interpreted in this broad sense. It can be thought of as reflecting the barriers to FDI and will shrink as the degree of globalisation increases.
Firms play a two-period three-stage game, acting simultaneously in each stage.
The sequence of decisions is shown in Figure 1 . In period one, production locations, [ Figure 1 about here]
Firms' location decisions are influenced both by non-strategic and strategic factors. The non-strategic aspects of the production location choice are examined first.
II. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND THE LOCATION DECISION OF A MONOPOLIST FIRM
To focus on the non-strategic determinants of location, we initially consider the limit case of e=0, when the products are no longer substitutes and so each firm becomes a monopolist. In the absence of strategic behaviour, only cost and flexibility considerations will determine firms' location decisions.
In period two, the firm maximises period-two profits, 2 π , which is equal to . Maximising expected profits with respect to 1 q and using the expressions in (5a) yields the same first-period output of
irrespective of where the monopolist is located. Combining expressions (5a) and (5b), period-two output of a firm located in Home can be rewritten as
To explain how a firm's location choices are determined, it will prove useful to decompose expected maximised profits ( π E ) as
The first term of expression (6),
Eu
, denotes deterministic profits,
where θ is deterministic operating profit and Φ is the (earlier defined) fixed costs For a monopolist firm, deterministic operating profits are independent of the production location (i.e., The location choice of a Foreign monopolist is intuitive: it will always produce in Foreign since this entails maximum flexibility without incurring the cost of FDI. For a Home monopolist, the location decision involves a trade-off between the costs of FDI and the flexibility benefits associated with producing in Foreign. With uncertainty, the firm anticipates it may face adjustment costs in Home, while there will be no adjustment costs if it produces in Foreign. High uncertainty increases the value of flexibility.
19 Thus, when uncertainty is high and provided FDI-costs are not prohibitive, the Home monopolist will produce in Foreign. There is a critical level of uncertainty above which the Home monopolist will choose to produce in Foreign and below which it will choose to locate in Home. More specifically, the monopoly firm settles in Home rather than Foreign if [ Figure 2 about here]
III. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND LOCATION UNDER COURNOT

COMPETITION
When products are substitutes, i.e. for e > 0, firms behave as duopolists and their location decisions involve both strategic and non-strategic considerations. From section 3 we know that Cournot and Bertrand competition both converge to the monopoly case at e=0. As e increases, the strategic effects become stronger and the two types of oligopolistic behaviour give rise to divergent location patterns. In this section, we derive the location pattern under Cournot competition; the location pattern for the case in which firms are Bertrand competitors will be derived in section 5. For expositional clarity, we explain the nature of the strategic effects in detail in the case in which each firm produces domestically, that is, the Home firm produces in Home and the Foreign firm in Foreign (i.e., (H,F)). The strategic behaviour in the other possible location equilibria will be discussed at the end of each subsection, referring
to Table 1 , which reports the strategic term in all possible location combinations.
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Employment protection and output decisions
Firms' production locations affect their market actions. Solving the game backwards, we first consider the firms' output choice in period two, in which locations and period-one outputs have already been chosen. When each firm produces domestically, (i.e., in the (H,F)-case), period-two profits for the two firms are respectively: 
Expressions (7a) and (7b) clearly suggest that a firm's location has implications for its flexibility. The Home firm's reaction function responds less to unexpected demand shocks than its rival's does (
from (7a) and (7b)) 20 . The firm in
Home is also less responsive to changes in rival output (i.e., 2 / ) 2 /( e e <
+ λ
). Also, due to adjustment costs, the Home firm's reaction function depends positively on its own past output, as captured by the term in 1 q . Solving expressions (7a) and (7b), we obtain:
We now turn to stage two of period 1. It is useful to write the firms' profit functions as: In this hypothetical benchmark, firms cannot act strategically (see Tirole 1988) .
Intuitively, strategic production in period one is aimed at ensuring a large future market share. By choosing a high output level in period one, the Home firm is forced to keep its production in the next period at a relatively high level, since changing its output then will be costly. This commitment to keep production high in period two forces the rival firm to cut back its output. Meanwhile, there is no strategic behaviour by the firm in Foreign given that there is no intertemporal link between the Foreign firm's output choices. [ Table 1 about here]
Location patterns with employment protection
We now turn to stage one, in which firms simultaneously choose their production location. Taking the rival's location as given, each firm selects the location that yields the highest expected profits. As in the monopoly case, expected profits can be decomposed into fixed costs, Φ , deterministic operating profits, θ , and the expected profit gains from the demand shocks, 2 γσ . Unlike under monopoly and due to strategic interaction between the firms, the value of a firm's θ depends not only on its own location but also on the location of its rival.
Under Cournot competition, the Home firm's deterministic operating profits at the different location combinations are ranked as follows:
while the ranking for the Foreign firm is given by
where the first superscript refers to the location of the Home firm and the second one indicates the location of the Foreign firm. The derivations of θ and γ are given in Appendix A and the θ-and γ-values for each location combination are reported in ). Conversely, a firm's γ is smallest when it is inflexible and its rival is fully flexible. Given the above pair-wise rankings, the full ranking of the γ -parameters in the different location combinations for the Home and Foreign firm is given respectively by:
The analysis of the firm's location decisions involves many unwieldy algebraic expressions and we provide the detailed formal analysis in Appendix B. In 23 In the open-loop benchmark in which, given firms' location choices, first-period actions are not observed and firms cannot set output strategically, the θ-values for every location combination would be the same.
16 the text, to ease the exposition, we shall illustrate all the qualitatively different cases that can arise from different parameter combinations using relatively few diagrams.
The figures are depicted in ) , ( 2 λ σ -space, which means that they are drawn at given values of δ and e. We distinguish between two qualitatively different cases, depending on whether the FDI cost δ is high or low. First, we focus on a situation in which FDI costs are sufficiently high for the foreign firm always to remain located in its own country (subsection 4.2.1). This allows us to discuss in detail the home firm's choice between locating at home in the inflexible market or going abroad in search of flexibility. Second, we shall explore how increasing degrees of globalisation (in the form of falling values of δ) influence location patterns (subsection 4.2.2). In contrast to the FDI-cost, the degree of product differentiation (captured by the reciprocal of e) tends not to affect location patterns in a qualitatively significant way. We will briefly comment on the effects of e as we examine each case. As product differentiation increases (i.e., as e falls), the area with domestic anchorage shrinks. The reason for this lies in the fact that product differentiation weakens competition between firms and hence weakens firms' strategic incentive to commit to overproduction. Such commitment can only be obtained through the mechanism of employment protection, which is only present in Home. So, as product differentiation reduces strategic overproduction, the Home firm will be less willing to stay domestically anchored for the sake of the strategic advantages associated with it, and be more inclined to locate in Foreign for the flexibility advantages associated with that location choice. In terms of Figure 3a , an increase in product differentiation will move the locus separating areas I and II inwards and downwards (in the limit case when e falls to zero, the Globalisation and strategic agglomeration One of the defining characteristics of the current wave of globalisation is that large firms have become increasingly footloose.
In our model this is captured by falling FDI-costs (δ ). As δ falls, other location equilibria, beside (H,F) and (F,F), start to emerge. Figures 3b and 3c show the location pattern under quantity competition for increasing but incomplete and complete globalisation, respectively. With increasing globalisation (i.e., ever lower δ ), it is easier for firms to invest abroad: hence, the cost to the Home firm of acquiring flexibility by investing in Foreign falls. In Figure 3b , the threshold uncertainty locus below which the Home firm produces domestically (i.e., the negatively sloped curve) is now lower than in Figure 3a . The area in which the Home firm is located in Home has shrunk (areas Ia and Ib in Figure 3b ), meaning that domestic anchorage is less easily sustained, while FDI by the Home firm into the Foreign location becomes relatively more important. This is reflected in an enlargement of area II in Figure 3b , in which (F,F) is the unique equilibrium. When low FDI costs are combined with low uncertainty, strategic considerations in the location decision become relatively more important. In fact, when uncertainty is low and the degree of employment protection in the Home location is high, even the Foreign firm will now find it worthwhile to pay the FDI costs and locate in Home. In Figure 3b , this is shown by the appearance of another locus (which remained in the negative orthant at higher levels of FDI costs), along which the Foreign firm is indifferent between locating in Home or Foreign given that the Home firm is located in Home (defined by ( ) 
Employment protection and price decisions
As under Cournot competition, we first concentrate on the case in which each firm produces domestically (i.e., the (H,F)-case).
Starting with the final stage of the game, the second-period price reaction functions are given by (14b)). Since the firm in Home is less flexible in output, unexpected demand shocks will be translated in larger price fluctuations. For the same reason, the Home firm's optimal second-period price is more responsive to changes in its rival's price (or, 2 / ) 2 /( ) 1 ( e e > + + βλ βλ ). The Home firm's past output level enters negatively in its second-period price reaction function. As output is sticky in the presence of employment protection, a higher output in period one is associated with a higher output in period two and therefore with a lower price.
Solving for second-period prices, we obtain: Inspection of (15a) and (15b) reveals that a high Home output in period one leads to low second-period prices for both firms. Intuitively, with employment protection, a high Home output in period one will give rise to a high Home production level in period two, that will translate into low period-two prices for both the Home andsince prices are strategic complements -the Foreign firm. Note that under Bertrand competition, the Home firm cannot choose its period-one output directly as 1 q depends on the Home firm's first-period price and on that of its rival (see expression (13a)). The dependence of second-period prices on both firms' period-one prices has important implications for firms' price setting in period one, to which we now turn.
In stage two, firms simultaneously set first-period prices, taking into account their effect on future prices. For convenience, we rewrite the profit functions as: 
= dp dp p E p E dp = dp dp p E p E dp > ∂ ∂ dp dp p E π , as shown in < ∂ ∂ dp dp p E π , as reported in Table 1 
Furthermore, even though its output is fully flexible, the strategic effect (per unit of output) for the firm in Foreign is larger in absolute value than that for the firm in Home.
The intuition for the strategic behaviour in the Bertrand case is quite subtle.
Under Bertrand competition, a firm's strategic pricing in period one is aimed at increasing the future price of its rival's product. This in turn raises its own secondperiod profit. From expressions (15a) and (15b), we know that future prices can be pushed up by a low Home output level in period one. Since firms choose prices, both firms can manipulate the Home firm's period-one output by choosing period-one prices strategically: the Home firm aims to keep 1 q low by increasing its product price, while the Foreign firm makes sure 1 q is kept low by selling its own product at a low price. Each firm's strategic pricing behaviour pushes up the Home firm's expected price in the next period and -because prices are strategic complementsalso the Foreign firm's expected price in period two. So, employment protection can act as a facilitating device for driving future expected prices up, even if only one firm is located in a country with employment protection laws and in spite of the fact that prices are chosen non-cooperatively.
So far, only the (H,F)-case has been discussed. In the (F,H)-case, the Home firm (now located in the flexible Foreign location) will act strategically by underpricing in period one, while its Foreign rival (now located in Home and hence inflexible in output) will choose to over-price. We find that the firm in the flexible location produces higher expected outputs and the firm in the inflexible location produces lower expected outputs than in the corresponding open-loop equilibrium.
This contrasts with our Cournot results. Under Bertrand, in (H,F) and (F,H) the market is more competitive in the first period but less competitive in the second period than in the open-loop case. If both firms produce in Foreign, (F,F), neither firm sets prices strategically. If both firms produce in Home, (H,H), then both firms will strategically under-price in period one (see Table 1 ): even though a concern for high future prices gives each firm an incentive to keep its first-period production low (by strategically over-pricing in period one), it creates an even greater incentive for firms to keep their rival's first-period production low (by strategically under-pricing 
Location pattern with employment protection
We now turn to stage one, in which firms simultaneously choose their production location, taking into account how locations affect expected profits. Again, expected profits can be decomposed into fixed set-up costs, Φ , deterministic operating profits, θ , and the expected profit gains from the demand shocks, 2 γσ .
The ranking of the γ -parameter in the different location combinations is given by expressions (12a) and (12b) for the Home and the Foreign firm, respectively. Thus, although the actual values of the γ -parameter differ, the ranking is the same as under Cournot competition and the intuition is also the same.
We now discuss the ranking of the θ -values when firms set prices. As explained in the previous subsection, being inflexible encourages the rival firm to strategically under-price in period one in order to reduce the inflexible firm's firstperiod output and so raise its price in the future. This aggressive strategic behaviour by its rival hurts an inflexible firm's operating profit. Hence, when facing a flexible rival, firms have, from a purely strategic point of view, an incentive to favour the θ take in these rankings depends on the level of λ . In (F,H) and (H,F), the flexible firm strategically under-prices in period one to increase its profits in period two and it becomes increasingly aggressive in doing this the larger is λ. This commitment to under-pricing in period one leads to a lower rival price in that period that hurts the flexible firm's operating profit in these asymmetric cases.
This becomes more serious the larger is λ. Hence, we find that, as long as the degree of employment protection (λ) is not too high, where − as we saw earlier − the Home location holds strategic advantages). Hence, under Bertrand, the Home firm has an additional incentive to leave the country with employment protection -to escape its rival's harmful strategic pricing behaviour.
Thus, there is a strategic de-anchorage effect when firms set prices.
As product differentiation increases (i.e. as e falls), strategic behaviour and hence the reason for strategic de-anchorage is diminished. As a result, the area in which ) , ( F H is the equilibrium expands (while it shrinks under Cournot competition). Importantly, the area in which the home firm stays at Home is always largest under Cournot behaviour. 25 In the figures, the maximum value for λ is limited to ensure the existence of all possible equilibria. The location effects of deepening globalisation prove to be qualitatively robust to changing degrees of product differentiation. As product differentiation increases (e falls), strategic agglomeration still occurs, but only at lower levels of uncertainty.
Globalisation and strategic agglomeration
V. EXTENSIONS
In this section we explore the implications of modifying some of the assumptions of our model. Specifically, we discuss what would happen if firms were not to choose their locations simultaneously. We also briefly discuss ways in which trade costs could be incorporated into the model, as well as the implications of relaxing the implicit assumption that the discount factor is unity and how endogenous factor prices, either due to the presence of unions or general equilibrium effects, might be expected to alter the results.
Sequential location choices
In our analysis we have assumed that firms choose production locations simultaneously. It is of theoretical interest, however, to explore how sequential location choices affect firm location patterns.
When FDI-costs are high or intermediate (Figures 3a-3b and 4a-4b) , the location pattern with sequential decisions is not different from the one observed under simultaneous decisions. 27 When FDI-costs are low or non-existent (Figures 3c and   4c ), the location pattern changes slightly. While nothing changes in the areas with a unique location outcome, only the (F,F)-equilibrium will survive in the regions with multiple equilibria (area II in Figure 3c and area I in Figure 4c ). The reason for this lies in the fact that the firm that moves first can "pick" the equilibrium in which its expected profits are highest. From a pure flexibility perspective, each firm prefers agglomeration in Foreign to agglomeration in Home (from (12a) and (12b),
). Furthermore, both firms also prefer (F,F) to (H,H) for strategic reasons, both under Cournot (from (11a) and (11b)) and under Bertrand competition (from (18a) and (18b)). Hence, irrespective of which firm moves first, the equilibrium that emerges in the areas considered will always be (F,F). Hence, in a completely globalised world, sequential location decisions work against agglomeration in Home. Note, however, that strategic agglomeration in the Home country is not completely eliminated when location decisions are made sequentially:
(H,H) remains the unique location outcome in area I of Figure 3c .
Trade costs
In our analysis we have chosen not to model trade costs explicitly given our aim to focus on how the location decision is affected by differences in local labour markets.
This flexibility factor can be seen in sharper relief when we abstract from trade-cost jumping reasons for doing FDI. Our approach follows other related papers in the employment protection and FDI literature, in particular those of Haaland et al (2002) and Haaland and Wooton (2007) , in assuming that the firms sell on to a single integrated market, such as could exist in a customs union. 28 In such a scenario, even though the market for the final good is integrated, countries' labour market institutions differ − as is indeed the case between EU member states. The model could clearly be extended to take account of non-integrated final goods markets, separated by trade costs. A natural way to do this would be to employ the reciprocal markets framework, first pioneered by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) . Clearly, incorporating trade costs and market segmentation in this manner into our model would overlay a proximity-concentration trade-off on the existing flexibility-commitment trade-off . However, doing so would have the drawback of adding considerably to the complexity of the model without necessarily providing many interesting additional insights as can be obtained from studying the two issues separately. Basically, firms would export rather than do FDI when trade costs are relatively low and FDI costs are relatively high, whereas they would do FDI when the relative FDI costs are low enough. The parameter values (trade costs and FDI costs) at which they will switch would depend on the degree of employment protection, the degree of uncertainty and the mode of competition. However, qualitatively, the 28 manner in which these employment protection and flexibility factors affect location will be analogous to how they affect location in our model with integrated markets.
The discount factor
We have implicitly assumed that the firms do not discount future profits, i.e., the discount factor is unity. Lower levels of the discount factor lead to a reduction in strategic behaviour as the strategic actions are taken in the first period but reap benefits only in the second. Thus, for instance, the first-order condition for a quantity setting firm located in the inflexible location that was given in (10a) becomes
, where the discount factor is represented by ρ .
As ρ falls towards zero, all the θ -values under Cournot converge since the differences between these depend only on strategic behaviour. Likewise, all the Bertrand θ -values get closer to each other as the value of ρ falls. The benefits of flexibility also accrue in the second period and so the γ -values all go to zero as ρ goes to zero. Since the setup costs − including the FDI costs − are incurred upfront in period one, these become relatively more important in determining location when the discount factor is lower. When the discount factor goes to zero, issues of flexibility and commitment disappear and firms then locate in their own country to minimise setup costs.
Endogenous factor prices
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the marginal cost of production (c) is constant and the same in both locations. In doing so, we have abstracted from general equilibrium effects on factor prices as well as the possibility of wages being set in a union-bargaining framework.
The partial equilibrium approach that we follow in this paper -in line with most of the oligopoly literature -can be justified by seeing firms as small relative to the size of the factor market and the economy as a whole, even though they are large in their particular industry. Although our model is already too complex to be nested in a general equilibrium framework 29 , it is nevertheless worthwhile to briefly discuss 29 how general equilibrium effects on factor prices might affect the results. As we show, agglomeration equilibria ((H,H) or (F,F)) can emerge. In a general equilibrium setting, such agglomeration in one country would likely cause factor prices in that country to rise, as shown in the economic geography literature. 30 Higher factor prices in a particular location would make it less attractive; that is, they would work as a countervailing force, dampening the degree of agglomeration somewhat. By ignoring such general equilibrium effects and focussing instead on the behaviour of firms within industries we are able to bring out the effects of strategic interaction in the clearest possible way.
We have also abstracted from the role of unions in this paper. If employment protection is strengthened, union wages may increase in countries with strong unions, in which case the potential strategic advantage associated with strict employment protection would be mitigated by the strategic disadvantage implied by high wages.
However, it is by no means certain that this scenario is the most likely one. Leonardi and Pica (2007) present evidence that, with strict employment protection and union wage bargaining, firms make workers prepay the severance cost. Thus, even in the presence of unions, increases in employment protection do not necessarily imply higher wages. Modelling the possible interaction between employment protection and wages would be important if we were to derive the optimal level of employment protection. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have explored how differences in labour market flexibility affect location decisions when future demand is uncertain and firms act strategically. When demand uncertainty is high, firms will cluster in countries where the labour market is relatively flexible, thus avoiding costly redundancy packages during economic slowdowns and expensive overtime payments or hiring costs in economic booms.
However, when firms act strategically, they may be willing to forego flexibility and produce in countries where the labour market is relatively inflexible in order to obtain strategic advantages. This is the case when the firms engage in Cournot behaviour. Under quantity competition an inflexible location allows a firm to commit to high future output, which makes the inflexible location more attractive at 30 low levels of uncertainty. This strategic advantage helps to maintain domestic anchorage of firms in locations with strict labour regulations. Under price competition however, a firm located in the inflexible country faces aggressive pricing from its flexible rival in period one. As a result, the inflexible location is unfavourable both from a strategic and a flexibility perspective. Hence, both strategic and flexibility incentives work against domestic anchorage under Bertrand competition.
We have shown that deepening globalisation can lead to a greater tendency for the development of strategic agglomeration. This is the case under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Under Cournot competition, firms facing low FDI-costs cluster in the inflexible location when uncertainty is low. Such clustering has however a prisoner's dilemma character, with firms all producing higher output and enjoying less flexibility than they would in a location with lower labour adjustment costs.
Under Bertrand competition, this can also occur, but only at very high levels of employment protection and when uncertainty is very low. In fact, when strategic agglomeration occurs under price competition, it does so mainly in the flexible location as firms flee the strategically unfavourable inflexible location.
When formulating policy lessons from this analysis, one should proceed with caution. We have not derived optimal employment protection levels in this paper, nor have we allowed for a link between employment protection and firms' marginal costs -as might exist if, by strengthening workers' bargaining power employment protection results in higher wages. Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the level of employment protection is exogenous. This is a reasonable assumption since the political reluctance to change employment protection regulations, once these are in place, is often strong. It does not, however, preclude policy makers from using location-dependent fiscal incentives to increase the attractiveness of their region. Our analysis suggests that countries with strict labour regulations will find it less difficult to achieve domestic anchorage of key industries, by using fiscal incentives, when firm behaviour is approximated by Cournot rather than by Bertrand competition. 31 Thus,
we have highlighted a potentially important additional channel through which employment protection might affect location incentives, which may strengthen in some circumstances the effectiveness of other policies aimed at increasing the attractiveness of a region to investors. In so doing, the paper points to a potentially fruitful empirical agenda.
Different labour market policies are typically studied in isolation and this paper is no exception. However, as evidenced by current debates about flexicurity, would depend on how the unemployment benefits that replace employment protection are paid for. State funded unemployment benefits will eliminate the inflexibility mechanism highlighted in this paper. However, as shown by Blanchard and Tirole (2008) , who examine theoretically the joint determination of unemployment benefits and employment protection, a first-best policy entails financing unemployment benefits by layoff taxes on firms. Although, in the absence of general equilibrium effects as is the case in our paper, the introduction of such a policy mix should not alter the qualitative nature of our results, this remains a promising direction for future research. 
APPENDIX A -DECOMPOSITION OF MAXIMISED EXPECTED PROFITS
Under Cournot competition
From (9a) and (A.5) follows: Equilibrium first-period and expected second-period outputs for both firms are found by solving (8a),(8b), (10a) and (10b).
The decomposition of firms' expected profits in terms of θ , 2 γσ and Φ for (H,H), (F,H) and (F,F) is obtained from a procedure that is similar to the one outlined for the (H,F)-case. 
The location pattern under Cournot competition
In Figure 3a , FDI costs are so that ( ) 0 
The location pattern under Bertrand competition
In Figure 4a , the Foreign firm never locates in Home as we assumed the FDI-costs are too high. Along the 
